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GOODS, AND THE LOST ART 
OF GRAND STRATEGY: AMERICAN 
POLICY TOWARD THE 
PERSIAN GULF AND RISING ASIA IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 
Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett* 
INTRODUCTION 
Just twenty years ago, the United States emerged from the 
Cold War with a multi-faceted supremacy the world had not 
witnessed for centuries. For some observers, even the British Empire 
at its heyday was an inadequate comparison; in their view, one had to 
go back to imperial Rome to find a suitable analogue to the United 
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States at the dawn of the post-Cold War era. If, however, one 
compares where America was twenty years ago to where it is today, in 
terms of its ability to achieve its stated, high-priority objectives, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States is a declining 
power. 
While no single factor explains the relative decline of 
American standing and influence in world affairs, one of the most 
important is the failure of American political and policy elites to 
define clear, reality-based goals and to relate the diplomatic, 
economic, and military means at Washington’s disposal to realizing 
them soberly and efficaciously. Defining such ends and relating the 
full range of foreign policy tools to their achievement is the essence 
of what is known among students of international relations and 
national security practitioners as “grand strategy.”1 Questions of 
grand strategy are becoming an increasingly important element in 
America’s emerging national security narrative—because of 
accumulating policy failures, relative economic decline, and the rise of 
new power centers in various regional and international arenas. 
At its core, our argument is that, to arrest the ongoing decline 
in its global position and to put its foreign policy on a more 
constructive trajectory, the United States must recover a capacity for 
sound grand strategy. This proposition is especially applicable in 
evaluating Washington’s posture toward two regions where the 
effectiveness of American policy will largely determine the United 
States’ standing as a great power in the 21st century: the Middle East 
(with a focus on the Persian Gulf) and rising Asia (with a focus on 
China). Fundamental flaws in America’s stance vis-à-vis these critical 
areas have contributed much to the erosion of the United States’ 
strategic standing. Over time, deficiencies in policy toward each of 
them have become synergistic with deficiencies in policy toward the 
other. Recovering a capacity for sound grand strategy will require a 
thoroughgoing recasting of American policy toward both—and a 
more nuanced appreciation of the interrelationship between these 
vital parts of the world for U.S. interests. 
                                                 
1 See Richard Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein, Beyond Realism: The Study of 
Grand Strategy, in THE DOMESTIC BASES OF GRAND STRATEGY 3-5 (Richard 
Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 1993).  
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We offer the present essay, organized in four sections, as a 
contribution to this process. The first section looks broadly at what 
has gone wrong with American grand strategy in the post-Cold War 
period. The second and third sections concentrate on the evolution 
of Washington’s posture toward the Persian Gulf and toward China, 
looking in particular at what that evolution reveals about the 
deficiencies in U.S. grand strategy. The fourth section presents 
concluding observations. 
I. GLOBALIZATION, GRAND STRATEGY, AND AMERICAN PRIMACY 
John Lewis Gaddis describes a great power’s grand strategy as 
a framework for “the calculated relationship of means to large 
ends . . . relating all of the means at your disposal to the ends you 
have in view.”2 For any state, the most essential “large end” is 
protecting its territorial and political integrity. Beyond this, grand 
strategies—especially those of great powers like the United States—
are typically designed to improve states’ positions relative to others, 
by enhancing their ability to shape favorable strategic outcomes, 
maximizing their transnational influence, and bolstering their long-
term economic prospects. Thus, a grand strategy should have 
embedded within it a theory of how the world works that can guide 
policymakers in marshaling the elements of national power toward 
their states’ objectives.3 In this regard, diplomacy—a state’s capacity 
                                                 
2 John Lewis Gaddis, Robert A. Lovett Professor of History, Yale 
University, Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture at Duke University: What 
Is Grand Strategy? (Feb. 26, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://tiss.sanford.duke.edu/documents/KEYNOTE.doc). 
3 See BARRY POSEN, THE SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE: FRANCE, 
BRITAIN AND GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 13 (1984) (calling grand 
strategy “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”); Paul 
Kennedy, Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition, in GRAND 
STRATEGY IN WAR AND PEACE 5 (Paul Kennedy ed., 1991) (elaborating that “the 
crux of grand strategy lies in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to 
bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the 
preservations and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and 
peacetime) best interests.”). These definitions distinguish grand strategy from more 
conventional uses of the word “strategy,” which, for students of international 
affairs, tend to focus on applying military force to achieve particular goals. (Posen 
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to increase the number of states prepared to cooperate with it and 
reduce its actual or potential adversaries—is as much a part of grand 
strategy as military might.4 Economic power—as the foundation for a 
nation’s military posture and as a source of influence in its own 
right—is also a critical aspect of grand strategy.5 
Above all, grand strategies guide statesmen in their approach 
to the balance of power. One of the more confusing aspects of the 
established vocabulary for talking about international relations is 
multiple definitions of “balance of power.”6 Even in this article, we 
cannot avoid multiple definitions. In one, the balance of power is 
simply an analytic framework for assessing the relative distribution of 
power among international actors. In another, the balance of power 
is a fundamental feature of life in the anarchic arena of international 
politics: by a logic as ancient as Thucydides, as a state grows more 
powerful, others have strong incentives to push back against it—that 
is, to engage in countervailing or “balancing” behavior.7 To add a 
further level of terminological complexity, international relations 
                                                 
refers to this notion of strategy as “military doctrine.”). See also SCOTT SIGMUND 
GARTNER, STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT IN WAR 16-22 (1997).  
4 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 5.   
5 On these aspects of economic power, see generally JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 55-82 (2001); Paul 
Kennedy, Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Britain, in STRATEGY AND 
DIPLOMACY, 1870-1945: EIGHT STUDIES 87-106 (1983); Paul Kennedy, Remarks at 
the Council on Foreign Relations (Dec. 14, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/sinews-power-rediscovering-foundati 
ons-national-strength/p21037); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 32-39 (2005 
ed. 1984); BENN STEIL & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE 
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2006); INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY POWER (David M. Andrews, ed., 2006).   
6 See generally Ernst Haas, The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or 
Propaganda, 5 WORLD POL. 442 (1953); INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1962); Martin Wight, The Balance of Power and 
International Order, in THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF C. A. W. MANNING (Alan James ed., 1973). 
7 See Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,  
INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1985, at 3 (drawing a distinction between the balance of 
power and the “balance of threat,” Walt argues that states do not necessarily 
balance against the most powerful state, but against what they see as the biggest 
threat to their interests). 
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scholars studying the concept of balancing distinguish between 
“internal balancing” (that is, a state mobilizing its own defense 
resources) and “external balancing” (forming alliances with other 
states).8 In yet another definition, “balance of power” connotes an 
equilibrium in international affairs, a stable distribution of power 
among states toward which reality tends—or, more normatively, 
should be encouraged—to go.9 This is perhaps the most challenging 
definition of all, for history shows that there is no consensus among 
students and practitioners of international politics about the 
conditions for such equilibrium.10 Some argue that distributions of 
power are truly stable only if they accommodate the core interests of 
all relevant players. Others argue that such an approach is possible 
only among states that support established rules for international 
interaction; from this perspective, the recurrent phenomenon of 
states deemed to have rejected the prevailing international order 
means that only a preponderance of power in favor of those 
supporting the status quo can ensure stability.11 
Over the past several decades, American policy has been 
pulled in opposite directions by two competing models of the United 
States’ optimal grand strategy. Both seek some form of primacy for 
the United States in international affairs. But each conceives of 
primacy very differently from the other. Operationally, the main 
difference between them is how they deal with the reality of deeply 
rooted structural incentives for states to balance against more 
powerful states that, at least potentially, threaten their interests. 
                                                 
8 See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 5, at 156-157.   
9 See Paul W. Schroeder, The Nineteenth-Century System: Balance of Power or 
Political Equilibrium?, 15 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 135 (1989) (suggesting that the term 
be replaced with “political equilibrium”).   
10 See Richard Little, Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of 
Thought, 15 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 87 (1989); Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Balance of Power 
Revisited, 15 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 77 (1989). 
11 But see Randall L. Schweller, Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security 
Dilemma?, SECURITY STUD., Spring 1996, at 90 (arguing that the distinction is 
problematic because, among other reasons, it overlooks the fact that consequential 
states—including, for most of its history, the United States—usually seek to 
increase their power relative to others even as they work within prevailing 
frameworks of international order). Nevertheless, the distinction continues to 
influence the way in which Westerners, and especially Americans, think and talk 
about international relations.   
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A.  The Leadership Model 
On one side, there is what we call the leadership model, 
whereby the United States seeks to maximize its international 
standing and influence by adroitly managing regional and global 
distributions of power and by promoting the processes of economic 
liberalization that have come to be known collectively as 
globalization. In every major area of the world, there are “natural” 
powers that inevitably figure prominently in their regional 
environments (e.g., Egypt, Iran, and Turkey in the Middle East and 
China, India, and Japan in Asia). Beyond such natural powers, 
globalization necessarily implies the diffusion of economic power—
and, with it, at least certain kinds of political power—across national 
boundaries. Thus, in a globalizing world, new power centers are 
bound to emerge. The leadership model rests on the proposition that 
only distributions of power which accommodate the core interests of 
all relevant parties can be stable. In accordance with this model, 
American policymakers should seek to manage evolving distributions 
of power, in key regions and globally, to accommodate the core 
interests of rising states alongside those of established powers. So 
defined, leadership calls on the United States to practice what might 
be described as classical diplomacy—that is, to engage the full range 
of relevant players in important strategic arenas, across multiple axes 
of geopolitical and geo-economic alignment, with the aim of finding 
areas of common interest and building productive relationships while 
simultaneously managing areas of disagreement. By doing so, 
American foreign policy can reduce the risks of military 
confrontation and ensure that rising powers develop cooperative 
rather than conflictual relations with their neighbors and with the 
United States. 
In the leadership model, America further justifies its 
management of regional and global distributions of power by playing 
a central role in creating and maintaining what economists call global 
public goods.12 Conventionally, public goods are defined as 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Global Public Goods: An Introduction, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 104TH ANNUAL MEETING (AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW), Mar. 
24-27, 2010, at 147; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public 
Goods, 78 INT’L AFF. 233 (2002). 
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“collective consumption goods” marked, as in the classic example of 
lighthouses, by two principal characteristics: they are non-rivalrous 
(that is, their consumption by one party does not reduce the quantity 
available to others) and non-excludable (no party can be blocked 
from consuming them). In a global context, public goods encompass 
the material and political arrangements necessary for globalization to 
be sustained. Examples range from efficient mechanisms for 
conducting, financing, and settling international exchanges of goods, 
services, and capital to viable governance structures for international 
financial and monetary relations, secure sea lanes, and a functioning 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Following the leadership model, the 
United States assumes special responsibilities for the provision of 
global public goods, to reduce the myriad problems associated with 
collective action among sovereign states. Additionally, in this model 
Washington acts to enforce its leadership in accordance with widely 
accepted international norms and processes. Thus, the leadership 
model tends to be linked to a fairly traditional stance on use of force 
doctrine. It basically accepts that, in the modern world, there are two 
conditions under which the use of force is legitimate: when 
authorized by the U.N. Security Council through a Chapter VII 
resolution,13 or under a narrow interpretation of the right of self-
defense as codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.14 
Consider two examples of the leadership model “in action.”  
For adroit management of the relative distribution of power, 
especially through diplomacy, there is no better illustration than the 
U.S. opening to the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. As 
Henry Kissinger recounts, Richard Nixon entered the White House 
in 1969 faced with the challenge of guiding America 
through the transition from dominance to leadership 
. . . for the age of America’s nearly total dominance of 
the world stage was drawing to a close. America’s 
nuclear superiority was eroding, and its economic 
supremacy was being challenged by the dynamic 
growth of Europe and Japan . . . Vietnam finally 
signaled that it was high time to reassess America’s 
                                                 
13 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
14 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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role in the developing world, and to find some 
sustainable ground between abdication and 
overextension.15 
In this context, Nixon understood that the United States needed an 
opening to China to shore up its position in Asia and revive its 
standing as a global power able to shape major strategic outcomes. 
To this day, some commentators argue that, for Washington, 
Sino-American rapprochement was motivated primarily by an interest 
in “triangulating” against the Soviet Union. The argument is both 
historically and strategically wrong. While Kissinger and other Nixon 
associates acknowledge that the triangulation argument helped Nixon 
ameliorate domestic resistance to realigning relations with “Red 
China,” they also affirm that, among Nixon’s immediate motives for 
an opening to Beijing, getting out of Vietnam was more significant 
than triangulating against Moscow.16 More importantly, Nixon saw 
rapprochement in broad terms, treating it, according to Kissinger, 
as an opportunity to redefine the American approach 
to foreign policy and international leadership. He 
sought to use the opening to China to demonstrate to 
the American public that, even in the midst of a 
debilitating war, the United States was in a position to 
bring about a design for long-term peace.17 
And that design required Washington to abandon a failed 
quest for hegemony in Asia; to pursue genuine rapprochement with 
the People’s Republic, based on mutual accommodation of each 
side’s core interests; and, by extension, to accept a more balanced 
distribution of power in Asia, in which China (the region’s ultimate 
natural power) would assume an increasingly important place. If 
Sino-American rapprochement had been solely or even primarily 
about triangulation against the Soviet Union, the U.S.-China 
relationship should have become less important after the Cold War 
                                                 
15 HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 703-704 (1994).  
16 See id. at 707; HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 213-214 (2011). The 
authors are grateful to Chas Freeman for his insights on this point. 
17 See KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra note 16, at 214. 
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ended; instead, it has arguably become the most important bilateral 
relationship in the world. 
As to the provision of global public goods, America’s 
commitment to secure the flow of oil and natural gas from the 
Persian Gulf to international energy markets serves as a rich case 
study. Since World War II, successive administrations have believed 
that the United States has a vital interest in exercising dispositive 
strategic influence over the security, production, and marketing of 
Persian Gulf hydrocarbons. But this interest has never had that much 
to do with America’s own energy demand. The United States came 
out of World War II self-sufficient in oil; indeed, it had provided 
most of the oil that its allies had used. It would not become a net oil 
importer for nearly another 30 years. Yet, in the early decades of the 
postwar era, American policymakers judged that a reliable flow of 
Persian Gulf oil was critical to the economic recovery of Western 
Europe and Japan—which, in turn, they considered essential to the 
United States’ own long-term economic prospects. U.S.-provided 
energy security would not only help to bind these countries to 
Washington as economic partners, but as consumers of U.S.-
provided security more generally.18 After the United States became a 
net oil importer in the 1970s, its own energy security became tied 
more directly to developments in the Persian Gulf. But America has 
never satisfied that high a portion of its own energy demand with 
supplies from the Middle East.19 Rather, it has assumed responsibility 
for securing these supplies, on which the global economy depends so 
heavily, to reinforce its strategic influence in other important parts of 
the world. This was driven home when a senior Japanese diplomat 
said to us that, if the United States did not guarantee the free flow of 
Persian Gulf hydrocarbons to Asian markets, it would lose many of 
its Asian allies. 
                                                 
18 See KEOHANE, supra note 5, at 139-141, 150-181, 190-195, and 202-
206; STEPHEN J. RANDALL, UNITED STATES FOREIGN OIL POLICY SINCE WORLD 
WAR I: FOR PROFITS AND SECURITY 110-318 (2005); RASHID KHALIDI, SOWING 
CRISIS: THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN DOMINANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 40-62 
(2009); DOUG STOKES & SAM RAPHAEL, GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY AND 
AMERICAN HEGEMONY 1-53 (2010).   
19 See CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO ENERGY—U.S. DEPENDENCE ON 
FOREIGN OIL SOURCES, (July 28, 2011), http://www.energy.org/cat00040 
918cmp00003628.html (for data). 
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More broadly, providing the public good of secure oil and gas 
flows from the Persian Gulf has undergirded America’s ongoing 
claims to global leadership. This historical reality has yet to gain real 
salience in nascent discussions about the shale gas and shale oil 
revolutions in the United States and their strategic ramifications. It 
appears increasingly clear that shale gas is going to make America 
self-sufficient (and then some) in natural gas. It seems less likely that 
shale oil will make America self-sufficient in oil again; still, it will 
reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil to some extent.20 But, even 
if the United States reached a point at which it never needed to 
import another hydrocarbon molecule, this does not mean that it 
“could forget about the Middle East,” as some suggest—unless it is 
going to get out of the great power business altogether. While one 
may argue that this is what the United States should do, proponents 
should acknowledge that ending the American commitment to ensure 
the free flow of Persian Gulf hydrocarbons would have profound 
implications for Washington’s role and standing in world affairs. 
B.  The Transformation Model 
Opposite the leadership model, there is what we call the 
transformation model, whereby the United States seeks not to 
manage distributions of power but to transcend them by becoming a 
hegemon, in key regions and globally. This model embodies the 
proposition that peace is only possible among states with a shared 
vision of international order. It is also congruent with a view that has 
been operative in American foreign policy debates at least since 
Woodrow Wilson: that to be truly secure, the United States must 
remake domestic polities in strategically consequential parts of the 
world, to create states inclined toward integration into U.S.-led 
political and security orders and the pursuit of market liberalization 
along U.S.-specified lines. Thus, the transformation model inevitably 
takes American policy beyond balancing towards what can 
                                                 
20 For analysis and projections, see Henning Gloystein & Oleg 
Vukmanovic, World to Gain From Gas Glut If Regulation Right—IEA, REUTERS,  
May 29, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/energy-gas-iea-
idUSL5E8GT49420120529; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2012 EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/; INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 (2011). 
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appropriately be called an imperial agenda—for molding states’ 
domestic systems and external alignments is at the heart of any 
imperial project. 
While, in the leadership model, Washington leads the 
institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms needed for 
globalization’s advance to enhance its standing, in the transformation 
model globalization itself becomes a frame for subordinating others 
to American diktats. From this perspective, the United States is not 
interested in providing true—that is, non-rivalrous and non-
excludable—public goods; it may, in fact, work to exclude certain 
states from various international institutional arrangements as a way 
of undermining them or leveraging their decision-making on issues 
that matter to Washington. In some cases, the transformation model 
has grounded U.S. support for “democracy promotion”; but, where 
democracy will produce governments resistant to subordination by 
Washington, the model’s hegemonic logic turns U.S. policy decisively 
away from democratization. Through this prism, even the defense of 
“human rights” is reduced to a selectively applied tool to undermine 
Washington’s opponents.21 
In the Cold War’s early days, transformationalist logic helped 
warp the grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union into what 
was, in many ways, a hegemonic project. As conceived by George 
Kennan, containment rejected Wilsonianism; as Gaddis notes, 
“[w]hat was required was not to re-make the world in the image of 
the United States, but simply to preserve its diversity against attempts 
to remake it in the image of others.”22 But Kennan’s fellow “wise 
                                                 
21 See ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY (2002); CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, THE PEACE 
OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO THE PRESENT (2006); 
Michael Desch, America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in 
U.S. Foreign Policy, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2007-2008, at 7; ANDREW J. BACEVICH, 
WASHINGTON RULES: AMERICA’S PATH TO PERMANENT WAR (2010); JAMES 
PECK, IDEAL ILLUSIONS: HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CO-OPTED HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2011). 
22 JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 55 (1982). See 
also IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL 
TERROR 32-53 (2007) (offering a post-9/11 perspective). 
 
2012 Leverett and Mann Leverett 1:2 
213 
men” had a different metric.23 Years later, recounting what he saw as 
the distortion of his original idea, Kennan said, “Do you know what 
[Secretary of State Dean] Acheson’s problem was?  He didn’t 
understand power.”24 Kennan’s interlocutor elaborates that: 
in Kennan’s eyes, Acheson and the other wise men’s 
mistake—and their extraordinary hubris—lay in their 
conviction that Washington could actually fashion 
and coordinate a global system that would leave it as 
capable of controlling its allies as of confronting its 
enemies. Instead, Kennan said, they would find . . . 
that Washington was no more able to prevent the 
emergence of independent centers of power than the 
Russians were in Eastern Europe.25 
The hubris Kennan decried lies at the heart of the 
transformation model; in the Cold War, it conditioned multiple self-
damaging policy choices, like the CIA’s 1953 coup that brought 
down a democratically elected Iranian government seeking a measure 
of strategic independence and restored Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi. From the communist victory in China’s civil war in 1949 
until Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to Beijing, it also produced two 
decades of dysfunctional China policy that undercut the U.S. position 
in Asia, culminating in the tragedy cum strategic stupidity of the 
Vietnam war.26 
Since the Cold War, transformationalism has driven a 
plethora of bad policy choices by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
administrations. In its neoconservative form, it prompts support for 
coercive regime change and, on use of force, disdain for the Security 
Council as insufficiently dominated by the United States and its 
partners, a definition of self-defense so broad that shifts in the 
distribution of power are a casus belli, and justification not just for 
                                                 
23 WALTER ISAACSON & EVAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN: SIX FRIENDS 
AND THE WORLD THEY MADE (1986) (originating the phrase “wise men”).   
24 See PECK, supra note 21, at 13. 
25 Id. 
26 See JAMES PECK, WASHINGTON’S CHINA: THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
WORLD, THE COLD WAR, AND THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALISM (2006) (on America’s 
policy toward China from the 1940s until the Nixon presidency).   
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preemption but for preventive wars (aka “aggression”).27 In its liberal 
form, it also supports regime change (albeit with more concern that it 
be done with at least a multilateral veneer), as well as “humanitarian 
intervention,” the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), “peace building,” 
and creation of a “Concert of Democracies” as an alternative to the 
Security Council. Likewise, the transformation model conditions 
definitions of global public goods so broad (e.g., on terrorism, human 
rights, and nonproliferation) as to be functionally indistinguishable 
from neoconservatism.28 Overall, it results in diplomatic obtuseness, 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, FOREIGN AFF., 
no. 1—America and the World 1990/91, 1990-1991, at 23; Charles Krauthammer, 
The Unipolar Moment Revisited, NAT’L INT., Winter 2002-2003, at 5; William Kristol & 
Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1996, 
at 18; Statement of Principles, PROJECT FOR A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY (June 3, 
1997), http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm; Max Boot, 
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705; Mission Statement,  FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.foreign 
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ALONE: THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (2005); JACOB 
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Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 35 (2009); 
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chronic indulgence of what Paul Kennedy famously called “imperial 
overstretch,” and military deployments that explain why, in this 
presidential cycle, American servicemen and their families donated 
more money to Ron Paul’s campaign than to all other Republican 
candidates and President Obama combined.29 
The chief reason U.S. foreign policy is failing is because, since 
the Cold War’s end, the global transformation model has gained 
almost complete ascendancy in American political circles. Policy 
deliberations in both major parties are today dominated by its 
champions: by neoconservatives in the GOP and by liberal 
internationalists in the Democratic Party.30 That is problematic 
because transformationalists, whether on the right or the left, reject 
the leadership model’s main premise. This premise reflects a lesson 
that balance of power theorists and foreign policy realists—even 
those of the offensive realist variety (as John Mearsheimer refers to 
himself)—all know: while hegemony seems nice in theory, in the real 
world it is unattainable; not even a state as powerful as the United 
                                                 
2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-and-global-public-
goods. For critical discussion, see Kristoffer Lidén, Whose Peace?  Which Peace?  On 
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THE SKEPTICS BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/trouble-global-public-goods-5757. 
29 See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987); 
Lauren Fox, Ron Paul Awash in Active Duty Military Donations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/ 
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30 See Stephen Walt, What Intervention in Libya Tells Us About the Neocon-
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.com/posts/2011/03/21/what_intervention_in_libya_tells_us_about_the_neocon
_liberal_alliance.   
 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
216 
States coming out of the Cold War can achieve it.31 Pursuing 
hegemony is not just quixotic; it is counter-productive for a great 
power’s strategic position, dissipating resources (Kennedy’s imperial 
overstretch phenomenon again)32 and sparking resistance from 
others. Pursuing hegemony ends up making you weaker. This is the 
critical factor that has undermined the effectiveness of American 
foreign policy over the last 20 years or so.33 
II. AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S SHIFTING 
BALANCE 
The counter-productive results of hegemonic grand strategy 
are visible in the record of America’s post-Cold War engagement in 
the Middle East. Currently, the Middle East is experiencing a period 
of historic political and social ferment, commonly called the Arab 
Awakening or Arab Spring. Many analysts and commentators, 
especially in the West, describe this as fundamentally a bottom-up 
phenomenon, as a manifestation of “people power.” But for those 
who focus on foreign policy, it is important to look at this from 
another angle: as the breakdown of the U.S.-led political and security 
order in the region—essentially the collapse of America’s post-Cold 
War effort to establish hegemony there. 
To unpack this, it is useful to put current events in historical 
perspective. From the end of World War II, Washington has worked 
to establish a political and security order in the Middle East favorable 
to its interests. During the Cold War, the United States was 
constrained from pushing for all-out hegemony in the region: 
constrained by another external superpower, the Soviet Union, and 
by important regional powers linked to Moscow—Egypt and Iraq. 
Over the course of the 1970s, in a process that culminated in the 
1978 Camp David accords, Egypt was “flipped” from the Soviet 
camp and became a U.S. ally. Nevertheless, America’s ambitions in 
                                                 
31 John Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith 
eds., 2006). 
32 See KENNEDY, supra note 29. 
33 For a brilliant exploration of this point see John Mearsheimer, Imperial 
By Design, NAT’L INT., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 111.   
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the region were still limited by the reality of Soviet power and 
regional influence. As a result, Washington was compelled to play 
more along the lines of the leadership model than it might have 
otherwise. 
A good example of this is the way the United States went 
about delivering on its commitment to assure the free flow of oil 
from the Persian Gulf. Though Washington defined this as a vital 
interest from World War II, for the first three and a half decades 
afterward, it did not commit the U.S. military to the task: in a Cold 
War context, it did not deploy significant forces on the ground in the 
Persian Gulf (or the Middle East more generally), so as not to give 
Moscow an excuse to do the same. Until 1971, successive 
administrations relied on Britain to provide day-to-day security in the 
Gulf.34 After British forces withdrew from the region (part of a pull 
back from imperial positions “east of Suez”), Washington pursued a 
“twin pillars” policy, relying on Saudi Arabia and, especially, the 
Shah’s Iran to police the Gulf in line with U.S. preferences.35 It was 
not until the beginning of 1980, following two portentous 
developments the previous year—the Iranian Revolution and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—that the United States, as a matter of 
declaratory policy, committed its own forces as the first line of 
defense for oil and gas flows from the Persian Gulf.36 Even then, for 
                                                 
34 Similarly, see ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN 
MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR 180 (2005) (noting that, for 
the Cold War’s first three decades, America operated in the Middle East in a 
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35 See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SAUDI ARABIA ENTERS THE 21ST 
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Administration “claimed to see both Iran and Saudi Arabia as key ‘pillars’ 
supporting moderate and anti-communist positions in the Gulf”; in practice, “the 
United States clearly relied largely on the [S]hah.”).  
36 In his January 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter 
declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force.”  This came to be known as “the Carter Doctrine.” President Jimmy 
Carter, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980) (transcript available at http:// 
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the Cold War’s last decade, it did this as an offshore balancer, acting 
from “over the horizon.” It built up a robust naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf; it also pre-positioned equipment and made basing 
arrangements so that it could surge land and tactical air forces into 
the region in the event of a crisis. But it did not put substantial forces 
on the ground there on an open-ended basis.37 
By 1989, however, the Soviet system was on the brink of 
collapse, leaving the United States effectively unconstrained in its 
perceived freedom to consolidate a highly militarized, pro-U.S. order 
in the Middle East—an order in which regional powers would be 
either coopted (like Egypt) or subverted. As a result, when Saddam 
Husayn’s Iraq, Moscow’s longtime ally, invaded Kuwait in 1990, 
Washington was able to deploy more than half a million U.S. and 
coalition troops to the region to forge what would become a largely 
pro-American political and security order there. This project 
continued after the first Persian Gulf war with the decision to leave a 
significant number of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia—a decision that 
led to the establishment of Al-Qa’ida and provided the rationale for 
the 9/11 attacks a decade later.38 It encompassed the extension of 
sanctions against Iraq that killed more than a million Iraqis (including 
half a million children) after Iraqi troops fled Kuwait—sanctions that 
were meant not to change Iraqi policy but to change the Iraqi regime. 
It also included the imposition of what remains a comprehensive U.S. 
economic embargo against the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supplemented by the threatened application of so-called secondary 
sanctions against third-country entities involved in developing Iranian 
                                                 
www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml). In October 
1981, in the “Reagan Corollary” to the Carter Doctrine, President Ronald Reagan 
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R. Kuniholm, The Carter Doctrine, The Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States 
Policy in Southwest Asia, 41 INT’L J. 342, 345 (1986). 
37 See BACEVICH, supra note 34, at 181-183, 185-193 (discussing the 
Carter Doctrine and America’s use of military force in the region during the 1980s).  
38 On this point, see ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC 
LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 16-24, 38-60, 79-96, 102-135 (2005). See also 
BACEVICH, supra note 34, at 193-199, and Mearsheimer, supra note 33 (treating the 
decision to keep U.S. troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War 
as a turning point in America’s regional posture). 
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hydrocarbons; over time, this threat has been extended to cover other 
types of business with Iran. After 9/11, America doubled down on 
its hegemonic drive, through invasions and prolonged occupations of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and, in 2005, declaring a “freedom agenda”39 
for the region. 
Now, less than twenty-five years after the Cold War’s end, in 
a perfect illustration of how the pursuit of hegemony is self-
defeating, the highly militarized political and security order that the 
United States strove so hard to create in the Middle East is 
disappearing. On the eve of 9/11, Washington seemed to have 
cultivated what U.S. policymakers like to call a strong “moderate” 
camp in the region. In America’s diplomatic lexicon, moderates are 
so defined not because of their approach to domestic governance, 
but because they are receptive to strategic cooperation with the 
United States and at least theoretically open to peace with Israel. 
Barely more than a decade ago this camp included Egypt, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab monarchies, North African 
regimes except Libya, and Turkey. On the other side were the 
“radicals” —again defined as such not because of their internal 
governance, but by their posture toward the United States and Israel. 
Ten years ago, Iran had already emerged as the de facto leader of this 
camp, which included Syria and relatively weak non-state actors like 
Hizballah and HAMAS, along with Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and 
Qadhafi’s Libya. All of the other radicals were wary, to say the least, 
of Saddam’s Iraq. Syria was generally considered, in American foreign 
policy circles, as a “swing” state in the balance between the two 
camps—that it, as a state which, with a peace agreement whereby 
Israel returned the Golan Heights to Syrian control, could potentially 
be persuaded to cut back its ties to Hizballah, HAMAS, and Iran and 
shift decisively into the “moderate” camp, thereby tipping the 
regional balance even more squarely against more radical or 
revisionist actors. Libya, it turned out, was already in discussions with 
Washington about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that 
would bring it out of the radical camp and put it at least on the 
margins of the moderate camp. 
                                                 
39 E.g., Freedom Agenda, GEORGE W. BUSH, WHITE HOUSE, http:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/. 
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By the eve of Barack Obama’s inauguration in January 
2009—that is, in less than a decade—the regional balance had shifted 
significantly against the United States and its allies. Relations between 
Iran and Syria had become increasingly strategic in quality. Turkey, 
under the Justice and Development Party (widely known by its 
Turkish acronym, AKP), was moving away from a reflexively pro-
American stance to chart a genuinely independent foreign policy, 
especially in the Middle East. HAMAS and Hizballah, now 
legitimated by real electoral successes, had emerged as not just 
effective paramilitary forces but as legitimate and decisively important 
political actors in Palestine and Lebanon. And post-Saddam Iraq was 
looking less and less like a strategic asset for the United States; it 
seemed ever more likely that Iraq’s most important relationships 
would be with the Islamic Republic, Syria, and a more independent 
Turkey. 
This decline in America’s regional position was largely self-
inflicted. American primacy in the Middle East has always rested on 
two things: capacity and legitimacy. In a powerful demonstration of 
hegemonic ambition’s inherent dysfunctionality, the United States 
has, in the post-Cold War period, exceeded the limits of its capacity 
in the region while simultaneously undermining its legitimacy there. 
With regard to capacity, America remains uniquely capable of 
projecting conventional military power into the Middle East, 
especially the Persian Gulf. No one else comes close to it in this 
regard; no one else, China included, will come close for years—
indeed, decades—to come. But strategically failed occupations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have underscored the limits of what the U.S. military 
can accomplish. And military power is becoming less relevant to the 
challenges Washington faces in the region. 
As to legitimacy, Washington has tried under successive 
administrations to gain Arab states’ buy-in to a U.S.-led, highly 
militarized political and security order in the Middle East on the 
grounds that this would bring good things to the region, including 
greater security and a resolution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. But, 
frankly put, America has not delivered. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have cost it dearly, not just in blood and treasure, but in the 
perceived legitimacy of its purposes in the region. Every 
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methodologically serious poll shows this. Likewise, it has become 
clear that America is not going to deliver on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Paradoxically, this is itself a kind of hegemonic assertion. American 
policy on Arab-Israeli issues is hardly grounded in balance of power 
politics—whereby aggressive pursuit of an Arab-Israeli settlement 
would be strongly warranted. Rather, the United States is playing the 
politics of hegemony, insisting that Palestinians and Arab states make 
peace with Israel on terms that are not just politically comfortable for 
Israel but that amount to the Arab states’ permanent subordination. 
While we do not underestimate the Israel lobby, it is not the source 
of this problem. The lobby is effective because it is pushing on a 
door already opened by America’s own hegemonic ambitions. Absent 
real peacemaking, Washington is seen as enabling an Israeli national 
security doctrine that, under the misleading label of deterrence, seeks 
a kind of regional hegemony for Israel, through open-ended 
occupation and freedom to use military force first, unilaterally, and 
disproportionately, for whatever purpose Israeli leaders deem 
desirable. That, too, has cost the United States in terms of the 
perceived legitimacy of its purposes in the Middle East.40 
America’s posture toward Iran has added to regional 
insecurity and further diminished local support for U.S. policy. While 
some Arab elites on the other side of the Persian Gulf see the growth 
of the Islamic Republic’s standing over the last decade as a threat, 
polls show that the vast majority of (Sunni) Arabs do not see it that 
way.41 Rather than trying to isolate, press, and undermine the Islamic 
Republic, the United States—for its interests, on balance of power 
grounds—needs to realign its relations with the Islamic Republic, just 
                                                 
40 On these points, see, e.g., the annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, UNIV. OF 
MD.: ANWAR SADAT CHAIR OF PEACE AND DEV. & ZOGBY INT’L, http://www 
.sadat.umd.edu/new%20surveys/surveys.htm. For discussion, see JAMES ZOGBY, 
ARAB VOICES: WHAT THEY ARE SAYING TO US, AND WHY IT MATTERS (2010).  
41 See Shibley Telhami et al., Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, UNIV. OF 
MD.: ANWAR SADAT CHAIR OF PEACE AND DEV. & ZOGBY INT’L (2010), 
http://www.sadat.umd.edu/new%20surveys/surveys.htm; Flynt Leverett & Hillary 
Mann Leverett, Who Says Iran Is Becoming Isolated in the Middle East?, RACE FOR IRAN  
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.raceforiran.com/who-says-iran-is-becoming-isolated-
in-the-middle-east; Shibley Telhami et al., Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, UNIV. OF 
MD.: ANWAR SADAT CHAIR OF PEACE AND DEV. & ZOGBY INT’L (2011), 
http://www.sadat.umd.edu/new%20surveys/surveys.htm. 
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as it realigned relations with the People’s Republic of China in the 
early 1970s. But that has not been the direction of American policy.42 
In his 2008 campaign, Barack Obama pledged to put 
America’s Middle East policy on a more effective and sustainable 
trajectory—in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli arena, and by 
engaging Iran. But, as president, he has turned the United States into 
a quasi-permanent occupying power by surging troops into 
Afghanistan with no meaningful strategy for a political settlement, 
and he is presiding over the death of a two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has also discredited engagement as a 
policy tool by saying that he tried but failed at reaching out to Tehran 
when, in fact, he never seriously tried. These developments have had 
a deeply negative impact on America’s regional position. Polls show 
that, after a brief and rather small bump in positive attitudes about 
the United States following Obama’s inauguration, his failures have 
driven its ratings back down; indeed, the perceived legitimacy of its 
purposes in the region is arguably lower today than when George W. 
Bush left office.43 Now, on Obama’s watch, the Arab Awakening has 
accelerated this decline. The collapse of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt—
a pillar of the U.S. position—was a particularly severe blow. In 
Bahrain, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, a Sunni monarchy detested by 
                                                 
42 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, The United States, Iran and the 
Middle East’s New ‘Cold War’, INT’L SPECTATOR, Mar. 2010, at 74; FLYNT 
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43 See Telhami, 2010 Poll, supra note 41; Leverett & Leverett, supra note 
41; James Zogby, Arab Attitudes, 2011, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOUNDATION, 
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its Shi’a-majority population was saved, for the time being, only 
through armed intervention by Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s pro-Western 
political order, a major U.S. counter-terrorism collaborator, has been 
seriously stressed. And Iraq has continued becoming an ever more 
important partner for Iran—as underscored, inter alia, by Baghdad’s 
insistence on the removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011.44 The 
Arab Awakening is not just changing the distribution of power in the 
Middle East; it is changing the very essence of power in the region: 
from hard power, where America has long enjoyed and will continue 
to enjoy unique advantages for the vastly foreseeable future, to “soft 
power,” defined by Harvard’s Joseph Nye as the capacity to get 
people to “want what you want” rather than coercing them through 
hard military or economic power.45 As public opinion matters more, 
in more situations, than in the past, this shift inevitably gains 
momentum. 
Before the Arab Awakening, the biggest beneficiary of 
America’s regional decline was clearly Iran. Through astute 
politicking and diplomacy, the Islamic Republic and its allies took 
advantage of the damage that U.S. policy choices did to the American 
position to boost their own standing and influence—not by 
increasing their hard power capabilities, but by building up their soft 
power. In effect, Tehran is seeking to shift regional politics from a 
traditional balance of power, based on hard power capabilities in 
which the United States has strong advantages, to what might be 
called a balance of influence, based on soft power assets in which the 
U.S. is at a severe disadvantage. Once the Arab Awakening began, 
Iranian policymakers judged—and, against conventional wisdom in 
Washington, still believe—that it would play out to Iran’s benefit. In 
their estimate—and it has the advantage of being true—any regional 
government that becomes more representative of its people’s 
                                                 
44 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Defeat in Iraq . . . and 
Iran’s Gain, RACE FOR IRAN (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.raceforiran.com/ 
americas-defeat-in-iraq-and-irans-gain; Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, 
Taking Stock of America’s Defeat in Iraq . . . and Iran’s Regional Role, RACE FOR IRAN 
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45 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
AMERICAN POWER 31 (1990). 
 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
224 
preferences and values is bound to become less enthusiastic about 
strategic cooperation with America and Israel and more interested in 
foreign policy independence. And that works to Tehran’s advantage.46 
Rather than charting a genuinely new strategy for the United 
States, Obama and his team have tried to use the Arab Awakening to 
rejuvenate America’s hegemonic aspirations in the region. Above all, 
the Obama Administration has sought to exploit the Arab Spring to 
marginalize Iran.47 This approach is grounded in an inaccurate 
assessment of the Islamic Republic as internally fragile and easily 
isolated. It also rests on the logic-defying proposition that the same 
currents empowering Islamists in Arab countries will, in Iran, change 
the Islamic Republic into a secular liberal state. Moreover, it has led 
Washington to make common cause with what we have described 
elsewhere as Saudi Arabia’s “counter-revolutionary” posture toward 
the Arab Awakening—ultimately not a winning hand for America.48 
One can see these factors in play in the Obama 
Administration’s response to the outbreak of what was initially a 
minor rebellion and then a low-grade civil war in Libya. To be sure, 
there was a range of influences shaping Obama’s decision to 
intervene in Libya. In his administration, there were and are 
influential advocates of humanitarian intervention and “R2P,” who 
                                                 
46 See Leverett & Leverett, GOING TO TEHRAN, supra note 42, at Ch. 2. 
For earlier statements of this argument, see Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann 
Leverett, Obama Is Helping Iran, FOREIGN POL’Y, Feb. 23, 2011, 
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9679D8B63&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=1. 
48 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, The Arab Spring and the Saudi 
Counter-Revolution, RACE FOR IRAN (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.raceforiran.com/ 
the-arab-spring-and-the-saudi-counter-revolution.  
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wanted to use the Libya case to consolidate a new doctrine (and even 
a new mechanism, one might say) for humanitarian intervention.49 
There were also those who saw the Libya intervention as a necessary 
“price” to pay for America’s continued leadership in world affairs: 
with Europeans and the Arab League coming to the United States 
and asking it to organize an intervention in Libya, if Washington did 
not respond, what would happen the next time it wanted Europeans 
and Arab states to support an intervention the United States really 
wanted? But, above all, President Obama and his advisers wanted to 
define an alternative narrative about the wave of popular agitation for 
political change in multiple Arab countries and about America’s role 
in it—a narrative that could be used against both Al-Qa’ida and the 
Islamic Republic. This misplaced calculation helped drive the Obama 
Administration’s decision to provide critical military support for 
multinational intervention to overthrow Qadhafi’s government. 
In the end, though, the Libya intervention has not worked to 
boost America’s regional position or to marginalize Iran. Polls show 
that the United States got no bump in its regional standing as a result 
of the Libya campaign. On other fronts, the campaign did further 
damage to the U.S. position. Among other things, it has discredited 
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism through diplomacy—
after what America and its allies did to Qadhafi, why should any 
government trade off its nuclear/WMD capabilities and/or give up 
ties to actors that Washington deems terrorists in return for what 
seem to be U.S. security assurances, grounded in a “new” relationship 
with Washington? 
The Libya intervention also polarized great power dynamics 
between the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China 
on the other. Both Moscow and Beijing saw the campaign, as it 
unfolded, not as a humanitarian exercise but as U.S.-led coercive 
regime change that was part of a broader effort to reshape the Middle 
East’s balance of power. From that, they came to see their 
                                                 
49 This camp included U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, National Security 
Council senior director for multilateral affairs and human rights Samantha Power, 
and Hillary Clinton’s first Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter (who 
has since left the Administration but continues to advocate intervention in various 
Middle Eastern states on the op-ed pages of major international newspapers).   
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acquiescence to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, which 
authorized “all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas” in Libya (including through imposition of a no fly 
zone), as a “mistake.”50 
At roughly the same time, the Obama Administration 
acquiesced in Saudi Arabia’s armed intervention to repress a truly 
broad-based popular movement for political change in Bahrain—
because the Khalifa monarchy’s demise was judged too big a 
prospective gain for Tehran. Yet, soon after unrest began in Syria in 
March 2011, the administration determined that Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad “must go.”51 This was not rooted in an objective 
assessment of on-the-ground conditions in Syria, but rather in a sense 
that regime change there would constitute a major blow to Iran’s 
regional position. Before March 2011, there were significant reasons 
to believe that the Assad government enjoyed the support of slightly 
more than half of Syrian society. If one considers where opposition 
activity has been most intense, it is in those parts of the country in 
which one would anticipate antipathy to the established order. There 
is no indication that either the protestors or the insurgents represent 
a majority of Syrians; available evidence suggests that, even today, 
Assad and his government retain the backing of just over half the 
                                                 
50 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). Russia 
and China abstained (a “no” vote from either country would have vetoed the 
measure), as did non-permanent members Brazil, Germany, and India. Within days, 
then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was sharply criticizing the resolution. 
See Putin Likens U.N.Libya Resolutions to Crusade Call, RIA NOVOSTI (Russ.), Mar. 21, 
2011, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110321/163126957.html%20(Russia%20and%20 
China%20abstained. By late April 2011, Putin was rebuking what he characterized 
as Western abuse of the resolution. See Ellen Barry, Putin Criticizes West for Libya 
Incursion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at Foreign Desk Column O, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/europe/27putin.html?_r=0. Putin’s 
views quickly became determinative of Russian policy regarding the Libya 
intervention. As for China, in conversations with the authors in June 2011, Chinese 
analysts and officials were already describing Beijing’s decision to let Resolution 
1973 through the Council as a “mistake.”   
51 Elizabeth Flock, Obama: Assad Must Go, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/ blogpost/ post/obama-it-is-time-for-
syrias-assad-to-go/2011/08/18/ gIQABPVpNJ_blog.html. 
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populace.52  Like the Bush Administration vis-à-vis Iraq, the Obama 
Administration has made its Syria policy in defiance of on-the-ground 
reality. The result has been ineffective at best, with the potential to 
inflict additional damage on America’s strategic position. 
Obama’s Syria policy has also further polarized U.S. relations 
with China and Russia. The Western approach to Syria confirmed 
Chinese and Russian assessments from the Libya intervention that 
America had embarked on a campaign to remake the balance of 
                                                 
52 E.g., an Internet poll conducted in December 2011 by an independent 
pollster with no discernible ideological or political agenda found that 55 percent of 
Syrians wanted President Assad to remain, YOUGOV SIRAJ, SYRIA’S PRESIDENT 
ASSAD – SHOULD HE RESIGN? (Dec. 25, 2011), http://clients.squareeye.net/ 
uploads/doha/polling/YouGovSirajDoha%20Debates-%20President%20Assad 
%20report.pdf (revealingly, the poll’s sponsors, the Qatar Foundation’s Doha 
Debates, billed the results as Arabs Want Syria’s President Assad to Go—Opinion 
Poll, THE DOHA DEBATES, Jan. 2, 2012, http://www.thedohadebates.com 
/news/item/index.asp?n=14312). Analysis of 18 large-sample Facebook surveys 
also suggests that Assad “still enjoys the support of a thin majority of the Syrian 
people,” see Camille Otrakji, Analyzing the Largest Syria Crisis Facebook Polls, THE 
SYRIA PAGE (Syria) (Jan. 24, 2012), http://creativesyria.com/syriapage/?p=129. See 
also Camille Otrakji, The Real Bashar al-Assad, THE SYRIA PAGE (Syria) (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://creativesyria.com/syriapage/?p=150. The Syrian government claims 
that 57.4 percent of the electorate participated in the February 2012 referendum on 
a new constitution,  and that roughly 90 percent of those who voted supported it,  
89 Percent Vote in Favor of New Syrian Constitution, RUSSIA TODAY (Russ.), Feb. 27, 
2012, http://rt.com/news/syria-referendum-constitution-results-307/. More 
recently, in May 2012, the Syrian government reported that just over 51 percent of 
eligible voters participated in the first parliamentary elections held under the new 
constitution. All of these results suggest that, even after more than a year of 
sustained unrest, just over half of the population continues to support retaining 
Assad as head of state and reforming the existing order over a wholesale change of 
regime. Additionally, in June 2012 Gallup reported the results of a survey 
conducted in five Arab states directly impacted by the Arab Awakening: Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. In every one of these states except Syria, large 
majorities of the population held that shari’a (Islamic law) should be either “a” 
source or the only source of law; in Syria, by contrast, a narrow majority believed 
that shari’a should not be a source of law. See Dalia Mogahed, Arab Women and Men 
See Eye to Eye on Religion’s Role in Law, GALLUP WORLD (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155324/Arab-Women-Men-Eye-Eye-Religion-Role-
Law.aspx (these findings are further evidence that just over half of Syria’s 
population continues to support the model of a secular state as embodied by the 
Assad government).   
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power in the Middle East. As early as June 2011, Beijing indicated 
that it opposed Libya-like intervention in Syria and was prepared, 
with Moscow, to use its Security Council veto to block proposals 
along these lines.53  Since then, China and Russia have done so three 
times—in October 2011, February 2012 and July 2012.54  With 
Chinese backing, Russia has pushed for a multilateral “contact 
group” on Syria. The Obama Administration, however, rejects the 
idea—because Beijing and Moscow believe that Iran’s participation is 
essential to a contact group’s effectiveness and because they will not 
agree to a process requiring, in its terms of reference, Assad’s 
departure.55 
                                                 
53 See As-safir as-sini li ‘is-safir’: bikin wa musku tarfdan at-tadakhal fi ish-shan 
id-dakhili is-suri [Chinese ambassador to “As-Safir”: Beijing and Moscow reject intervention in 
internal Syrian affairs], AS-SAFIR (Leb.), June 27, 2011.  
54 Russian FM Sergei Lavrov’s Interview to Russian Radio Stations Including the 
Voice of Russia, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/10/22/59151160.html; FM Lavrov Explains Russian 
Veto of Syria Resolution in UN, RIA NOVOSTI (Russ.), Feb. 5, 2012, 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120205/171151527.html; Vitaly Churkin, CHARLIE ROSE  
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12137; Chris Buckley, 
China Defends Syria Veto, Doubts West’s Intention, REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/china-syria-un-idUSL4E8D60VK20 
120206; Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another 
Resolution on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012 at A8, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-
un-sanctions-against-syria.html. 
55 See generally Liu Linlin, Differences Over Syria Continue During G20, 
GLOBAL TIMES, June 21, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/716285.shtml; 
Syrian Crisis Should Be Resolved Constitutionally—Putin, RIA NOVOSTI (Russ.), June 20, 
2012, http://en.rian.ru/world/20120620/174136736.html; Sergei Lavrov, On the 
Right Side of History, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2012), http://www.huffington 
post.co.uk/sergei-lavrov/russia-syria-on-the-right-side-of-history_b_1596400.html; 
Tian Wenlin, Promoting Syrian Regime Change Lacks Strategic Foresight, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (China), June 12, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/78435 
74.html; Foreign Minister Lavrov Syria Briefing (YOUTUBE, June 9, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7GZfTlsN9g&feature=youtu.be; Charles 
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Apart from tactical adjustments, Obama has retained the 
commitment to consolidating American dominance in the Middle 
East that he inherited from his predecessors. He has been no more 
willing than they to accept the incipient reality of a more balanced 
distribution of power in the region, or to institutionalize such a 
situation by pursuing real rapprochement with indigenous powers like 
the Islamic Republic. By continuing America’s post-Cold War quest 
for hegemony in the Middle East, Obama is compounding the 
damage that his predecessors have done to U.S. interests in the 
region. 
Beyond the ongoing decline of its regional position, 
America’s pursuit of Middle Eastern hegemony is undercutting its 
claim to provide the public good of energy security, with negative 
long-term implications for its global standing. Since the early 1990s, 
U.S. policy has done much to weaken the productive capacity of Iraq 
and Iran, two of the world’s major hydrocarbon provinces. Today, 
Washington’s efforts to compel Tehran to surrender the 
development of indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities—through 
sanctions and the continuing threat of U.S.-initiated (or Israeli-
initiated and U.S.-supported) military action—are the leading threat 
to the security of Persian Gulf hydrocarbon flows. Moreover, the 
expansion of Iran-related secondary sanctions to cover simple 
purchases of Iranian crude oil and most non-energy-related 
                                                 
09/world/middleeast/in-stance-on-syria-russia-takes-substantial-risks.html; Adrian 
Bloomfield, Syria: West Rebuffs Proposal to Work With Iran to Solve Crisis, THE 
TELEGRAPH ONLINE, June 8, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/middleeast/syria/9320576/Syria-West-rebuffs-proposal-to-work-with-Iran-to-
solve-crisis.html. See also Bassem Aly,  Geneva Conference on Syria: A Diplomatic Victory 
for Moscow?, AHRAM ONLINE (Egypt), July 3, 2012,  http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/2/8/46781/World/Region/Geneva-conference-on-Syria-A-diplo 
matic-victory-fo.aspx (reporting that at the first meeting of the “Action Group on 
Syria,” held under U.N.auspices in June, China and Russia insisted that draft 
language excluding figures from a conflict resolution process whose participation 
would block creation of a national unity government—language that the United 
States and other Western powers interpreted to mean Assad—be removed from 
the final communiqué). For discussion of the first meeting of the Action Group on 
Syria, with links to special envoy Kofi Annan’s draft and to the final text, see Laura 
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transactions with Iran is incentivizing emerging powers in the global 
South to develop alternatives to established, U.S.-dominated 
mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international 
transactions.56 
III. AMERICAN STRATEGY AND CHINA’S RISE 
In the Cold War’s wake, America’s newly enabled impulse to 
pursue hegemony more vigorously focused most immediately on the 
Middle East—because of the opening created by Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait and because dominating the Middle East seemed “do-able.”  
With the Soviet Union’s retreat and eventual collapse, there was no 
external power to constrain U.S. ambitions in the region; after the 
first Gulf War, there was no longer a regional power that appeared to 
pose “hard power” obstacles to Washington’s designs. 
In Asia, by contrast, there was the looming reality of China, 
as well as the diplomatic and strategic legacy of the bargain that 
Nixon and Kissinger had struck with the founding fathers of the 
People’s Republic in the early 1970s. Sino-American rapprochement 
allowed China to pursue deep cutbacks to its military in the 1980s, 
freeing up resources for economic development. But the 1989 
Tiananmen Square episode, followed by America’s display of 
overwhelming military might during the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, 
prompted Chinese decision-makers to invest once again in the armed 
forces. Still, from June 1989 to September 11, 2001, Beijing and 
Washington managed to forestall an all-out competition for regional 
hegemony in Asia.57 After 9/11, Sino-American tensions were, to an 
appreciable degree, put “on hold” as the United States tightened its 
focus on the Middle East. And for all that Chinese officials were 
concerned by what they saw as the destabilizing consequences of the 
                                                 
56 See Neelam Deo & Akshay Mathur, BRICS ‘Hostage’ to West Over Iran 
Sanctions, Need Financial Institutions, FIN. TIMES BLOG (June 27, 2012), 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/06/27/guest-post-brics-hostage-to-west-
over-iran-sanctions-need-their-own-financial-institutions/?catid=666&SID=goog 
le#axzz1ziHwBAfE (for a provocative analysis by a former Indian diplomat and an 
Indian researcher on geoeconomics). 
57 See ROBERT L. SUETTINGER, BEYOND TIANANMEN: THE POLITICS OF 
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, 1989-2000 (2003).   
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Iraq war and other Bush era initiatives, China also benefited in 
significant ways from America’s preoccupation with the region. (This 
was underscored when, a few years ago, a senior Chinese Foreign 
Ministry official wryly told us that “keeping the United States bogged 
down in pointless wars in small Middle Eastern countries” was a high 
priority on China’s foreign policy agenda.) 
As noted earlier, China is perhaps the ultimate natural power 
in Asia. Since 1978, Beijing’s embrace of the main elements of 
globalization has fueled impressive levels of economic growth and 
modernization in China. As this unfolded, the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis marked a turning point in Asia’s geopolitics and, more 
particularly, China’s regional role.58 Even if the Chinese economy 
does not expand as fast in coming years as in the three decades 
between 1978 and the 2008 global financial crisis, it is virtually certain 
that China will become an ever more important player in regional and 
global affairs.59 
Historically, the rise of new powers alongside already 
dominant states—especially established great powers with aspirations 
to hegemony, like the United States—is dangerous, often culminating 
in great power (or, after Robert Gilpin, “hegemonic”) wars.60 Beijing, 
though, seems less interested in replacing Washington’s hegemonic 
ambitions with its own than in moving from the more-or-less 
unipolar world of the early post-Cold War period to what Chinese 
analysts and officials describe as a more genuinely multipolar 
                                                 
58 See DAVID B.H. DENOON, THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC RISE OF 
CHINA AND INDIA: ASIAN REALIGNMENTS AFTER THE 1997 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(2007).   
59 See JOHN LEE, UNDERSTANDING AND PRESERVING THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICA’S ADVANTAGE IN ASIA 8 (2009).   
60 See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981). 
See also Randall Schweller, Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory, in 
ENGAGING CHINA: THE MANAGEMENT OF AN EMERGING POWER 1-32 (Alastair 
Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., 1999). For a sobering assessment of the long-
term structural risks of Sino-American conflict posed by China’s rise see also 
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 5, at 360-401; John J. Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful 
Rise, CURRENT HISTORY (Apr. 2006); John J. Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm: 
China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia, CHINESE J. INT’L POL., Winter 2010, at 381. 
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international order.61 Military modernization in the People’s Republic 
has been heavily focused on the development of what Western 
military analysts call “anti-access/area-denial” (A2AD) capabilities.62  
Beijing’s efforts to expand its power projection capacities (i.e., by 
developing “blue water” naval forces) seem aimed primarily at giving 
Chinese decision-makers better options for defending their country’s 
increasingly global interests (as when the PLA Navy deployed to the 
Mediterranean to oversee the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese nationals 
during NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya). There is no evidence 
that the PLA is out to establish an offense-dominant posture vis-à-vis 
the U.S. military; rather, it is out to reduce the U.S. military’s 
offensive prerogatives against China.63 Politically, the People’s 
                                                 
61 On China’s interest in moving to a more multipolar international 
order, see generally Wang Jisi (王缉思), Multipolarity Versus Hegemonism: Chinese 
Views of International Politics (多極化對戰霸權主義：中國的國際政治觀), http://www.sis. 
pku.edu.cn/faculty/blue/article.aspx?userid=12&classid=4&id=282; AVERY 
GOLDSTEIN, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2005); YUAN-KANG WANG, CHINA’S GRAND 
STRATEGY AND U.S. PRIMACY: IS CHINA BALANCING POWER? (2006). 
62 See Andrew Erickson & Gabe Collins, Near Seas ‘Anti-Navy’ Capabilities, 
Not Nascent Blue Water Fleet, Constitute China’s Core Challenge for U.S. and Regional 
Militaries, CHINA SIGNPOST 洞察中国, Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.chinasignpost.com 
/2012/03/near-seas-%E2%80%9Canti-navy%E2%80%9D-capabilities-not-nas 
cent-blue-water-fleet-constitute-china%E2%80%99s-core-challenge-to-u-s-and-
regional-militaries/ (on the place of A2AD in China’s military modernization 
efforts, co-authored by a research professor at the U.S. Naval War College). The 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has defined “anti-access” as enemy 
actions which inhibit military movement into a theater of operations, and “area-
denial” as activities that seek to deny freedom of action within areas under the 
enemy’s control, see Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting 
the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY 
ASSESSMENTS, May 2003, at ii, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2003/ 
05/a2ad-anti-access-area-denial/. 
63 On offense dominance, see STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: 
POWER AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT 1-192 (1999). Of course, perceived 
difficulties in distinguishing between offensive and defensive military capabilities lie 
at the heart of what international relations theorists call the “security dilemma,” see 
Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167(1978). In 
the case of the Sino-American military balance, however, these difficulties stem less 
from objectively ambiguous military and technological realities than from the 
United States’ hegemonic preferences; through the prism of the global 
transformation model, purely defensive military preparations by states seeking to 
preserve a measure of strategic independence are a threat to American interests. (A 
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Republic has sought to boost its regional influence not by 
intimidating its neighbors but by becoming Asia’s economic hub and 
through active participation in multilateral regional institutions.64 
Notwithstanding their focus on the Middle East, Washington 
political and policy elites have taken note of China’s rise as a major 
long-term challenge to their notions of American primacy. After the 
initial opening to China in the early 1970s and normalization of 
relations at the end of the decade, U.S. administrations sought to 
maintain a clearly hierarchical political and security order in Asia, with 
the United States just as clearly at the top of that hierarchy. But the 
ongoing power transition defined by China’s rise and America’s 
relative decline means that, as the distribution of power shifts more 
in its favor, Beijing will inevitably seek a larger role in the 
management of international affairs.65 It will also seek international—
above all, American—recognition of the legitimacy of China’s claim 
to such a role. This evolution challenges the United States to 
recognize China’s growing regional weight and to negotiate 
adjustments in the mechanisms governing the provision of various 
global public goods to reflect emerging economic and political reality. 
Washington, though, seems less interested in charting such 
adjustments than in reasserting its strategic dominance over the 
People’s Republic—a development that is spurring mounting 
                                                 
good example of this in the Middle Eastern context is U.S. opposition to Russia’s 
proposed sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran—a sale that Washington 
opposed because it would make Iranian nuclear facilities potentially less vulnerable 
to U.S. and/or Israeli attack). On this point, see also Randall L. Schweller & Xiaoyu 
Pu,  After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline, 
INT’L SECURITY, Summer 2011, at 45-46 (noting that balancing is inevitably seen as 
“revisionist behavior” under conditions of unipolarity).   
64 See Jane Perlez, For Clinton, an Effort to Rechannel the Rivalry With China, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, at A7 (reporting that China has now surpassed the United 
States to become ASEAN’s largest trading partner, going from being an 
inconsequential trading partner in the region as recently as the late 1990s to a two-
way trade volume of $293 billion in 2010). See also John Lee, China’s ASEAN 
Invasion, NAT’L INT., May-June 2007, at 89 (providing a more detailed explication of 
China’s multilateral “charm offensive” by an Australian analyst who supports 
American military primacy in Asia). 
65 For discussion, see DAVID LAI, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN 
POWER TRANSITION (2011). 
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concern in Beijing. In George W. Bush’s second term, as China’s rise 
passed the point of deniability, Washington began exhorting Beijing 
to become a “responsible stakeholder” within a U.S.-led Asian order, 
as well as in U.S.-led global systems; in effect, “responsible 
stakeholder” was diplomatic code for China doing what the United 
States wanted on major regional and international issues.66 The Bush 
Administration also launched a new strategic partnership between the 
United States and India which was obviously motivated, in large part, 
by an interest in containing China. 
Under President Obama, Washington has become even more 
focused on the prospects for reasserting U.S. hegemony in Asia, and 
Sino-American tensions are ratcheting up once again.67 In part, 
Chinese concerns are directed at the Obama Administration’s self-
declared “strategic pivot” from the Middle East to Asia.68 The term is 
a misnomer: while the United States was obliged to withdraw its 
forces from Iraq and is clumsily stage managing a protracted draw 
down in Afghanistan, it is hardly abandoning its drive to dominate 
the Middle East, as attested by Obama’s policies toward the Arab 
                                                 
66 See Thomas Christensen, Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent 
Lessons for the Obama Administration, WASH. Q., June 2009, at 91 (in which 
Christensen, who, as a State Department official in the Bush Administration’s 
second term, helped craft the “responsible stakeholder” paradigm for America’s 
China policy, explains its logic: “It is in China’s strategic interest as a rising power 
to exert greater effort to help maintain the system” that has enabled its rise; 
consequently, American policy should help “channel China’s competitive energies 
in more beneficial and peaceful directions.”). 
67 See LEE, supra note 59, at 9-13. We have adapted the notion of a 
hierarchical security order in Asia from Lee. While Lee contrasts hierarchy and 
hegemony, we hold that the kind of hierarchical order that Lee describes is, in 
effect, the platform from which the United States, under the Obama 
Administration, is now trying to assert something much closer to outright 
hegemony in Asia. 
68 See Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 
2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_ 
century. See also Kenneth Lieberthal, The American Pivot to Asia, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Dec. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_ 
pivot_to_asia?page=0,0; Zheng Wang, American Conspiracy: Strategic Suspicion and 
U.S. Re-engagement in Asia, ASIA POL’Y, July 2011, at 27-28 (reviewing Chinese 
reactions). 
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Awakening and Iran.69 Nevertheless, the Obama Administration is 
undertaking a series of military and political initiatives that, in the 
eyes of Chinese elites, are meant to “keep China down” by containing 
its rise as a legitimately influential player in Asian affairs.70 
On the military front, Chinese analysts acknowledge that the 
steps taken by the United States so far in the course of its 
“rebalancing” in Asia—e.g., the deployment of up to 2,500 U.S. 
Marines to Australia71 and expanded military relationships with 
multiple regional partners72 (including Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Vietnam)—are more symbolic moves than 
meaningful upgrades to American power projection capabilities in the 
Pacific theater. But symbolism is not unimportant; the Obama 
Administration’s decision not to invite China to participate with the 
U.S. Pacific Command in naval exercises in June 2012—exercises to 
which India and even Russia were invited— “stung even some pro-
American policymakers in China who saw it as further evidence of a 
deliberate containment policy.”73 And future steps are likely to be 
more substantial; Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently 
declared that, by 2020, 60 percent of America’s naval assets would be 
                                                 
69 On this point, Obama Administration officials have amended their 
vocabulary, relying more on the term “rebalancing” rather than “strategic pivot.” 
70 This was an important theme in our conversations with Chinese 
analysts, officials, and scholars during research trips to China in June 2011 and June 
2012. See also Kenneth Lieberthal & Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic 
Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series No. 4 (2012), at 7-19 
(for a powerful elaboration of Chinese perceptions and attitudes in this regard, 
especially in the chapters by Wang Jisi). 
71 See, e.g., UPDATE 2-First Marines in Australia as U.S. Ramps up Asia-
Pacific Focus, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/04/04/usa-marines-australia-idUSL2E8F3DU920120404; Matt Siegel, 
As Part of Pact, U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in China’s Strategic Backyard, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-
marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html. 
72 See, e.g., Rick Rozoff, America Threatens China: Pentagon Prepares for 
Confrontation in the Asia-Pacific Region, GLOBAL RES., June 3, 2012, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-threatens-china-pentagon-prepares-for-
confrontation-in-the-asia-pacific-region/. 
73 Perlez, supra note 64. 
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deployed in the Pacific.74 Politically, Chinese elites believe that 
Washington is encouraging Japan and several Southeast Asian states 
to be more assertive regarding their territorial claims vis-à-vis China 
in the South China Sea.75 Additionally, the Administration has 
launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which one Chinese 
analyst described to us as “a smaller APEC” meant by Washington as 
a new regional economic mechanism excluding China. 
Also, the Administration is not just upping the pressure on 
China in Asia; it understands that an ongoing quest for hegemony in 
the Middle East impels the United States to deal with China’s 
growing presence and influence there, too. In this regard, the 
prospect of a more strategic relationship between China and Iran, 
whereby the two countries literally fuel one another’s independence 
and relative rise, is fundamentally at odds with America’s hegemonic 
ambitions in the Middle East and Asia; it is thus a particular focus for 
Washington.76 More generally, the American response to the Arab 
Awakening has, as noted, affirmed Beijing’s concerns that the United 
States is out to remake the balance of power in the Middle East in 
ways that would be harmful to Chinese interests. 
This is a counter-productive and high-risk approach, rooted 
in an increasingly anachronistic assessment of China’s strategic 
outlook. In the post-Cold War period, the United States has gotten 
used to a particular (and relatively comfortable) sort of relationship 
                                                 
74 Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, Speech at the Shangri-La Hotel, 
Singapore (June 2, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681). 
75 See Frans-Paul van der Putten, The United States’ Dangerous Game in the 
South China Sea, CLINGENDAEL ASIA STUDIES AND CLINGENDAEL ASIA FORUM 
(Neth.), June 28, 2011, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110 
628_cas_clingendael_asia_forum_fputten.pdf (for an empathetic review of the 
Chinese perspective). See also John Lee, The End of the Charm Offensive, FOREIGN 
POL’Y, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/26/ 
the_end_of_the_charm_offensive?page=0,1 (for discussion of the perspective of 
smaller Asian states). 
76 See John Garver, Flynt Leverett, & Hillary Mann Leverett, Moving 
(Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing Its “Persian Gulf Dilemma”, 
Asia-Pacific Policy Papers (2009), http://www.sais-jhu.edu/centers/reischauer/ 
moving_slightly_closer.pdf (on Sino-Iranian relations and their implications for the 
United States).  
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with China. It seemed that, as long as the People’s Republic followed 
an export-led growth model requiring both access to the American 
market and managing the value of the yuan to keep Chinese exports 
competitive, China would have a powerful strategic interest in 
avoiding confrontation with the United States. This, in fact, was 
enshrined as a major tenet of China’s foreign policy under what the 
current, fourth generation of Chinese leaders (who will be leaving 
office during 2012-2013) called “the new diplomacy.”77 Increasingly, 
however, China judges that its economic accomplishments are 
simultaneously tied to a positive relationship with the United States 
and threatened by bad American policies. As the United States has 
faltered—through costly invasions of other countries, with other 
policies that prevent hydrocarbons from coming to market, and in its 
own economy—China’s economic vitality has been put at risk. 
Moreover, after the 2008 financial crisis—a largely “Made in 
America” affair, from a Chinese perspective—and in the face of 
Obama Administration policies that are seen in Beijing as inimical to 
Chinese interests, China’s willingness to defer to America’s 
international leadership is less than it once was. 
Consequently, Chinese policymakers are becoming more 
assertive in defending what they see as necessary to sustaining their 
country’s economic lifeline and strategic independence. To be sure, 
Beijing still does not want a confrontation with Washington. But its 
willingness to engage in what Robert Pape calls “soft balancing” in 
order to push back against what it sees as overly hegemonic 
assertions by the United States is growing.78 China’s three vetoes of 
Syria-related resolutions in the Security Council are an important 
marker in this regard. So too is the recent upturn in Sino-Russian 
                                                 
77 See Evan Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, China’s New Diplomacy, 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 22.   
78 As Pape notes, directly confronting U.S. military preponderance 
through traditional hard balancing measures “is too costly for any individual state 
and too risky for multiple states operating together.” Instead, major powers are 
likely to adopt “soft balancing” measures: “actions that do not directly challenge 
U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and 
undermine aggressive unilateral [American] policies.” Such “mechanisms of soft 
balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, 
and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition.” See Robert Pape, 
Soft Balancing Against the United States, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 2005, at 7, 9-10, 36.  
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strategic cooperation—on Syria, Central Asia, and a range of other 
high-profile international issues.79 In the near-to medium term, soft 
balancing of this sort seeks to constrain the harder aspects of 
America’s hegemonic ambition; in the longer term, it is aimed at 
delegitimating (or delegitimizing) U.S.-centered unipolarity and 
dispersing power more evenly throughout the system.80 
On the economic front, China is consolidating its position as 
Asia’s economic powerhouse; as a prominent Chinese expert on 
Beijing’s relations with the United States and Asia told The New 
York Times, “Asian integration without the United States is the real 
competition . . . the real challenge to the United States.”81 It is not 
clear to what extent China will shift from an export-oriented growth 
model to one placing relatively greater emphasis on domestic 
consumption. But Chinese officials have clearly and repeatedly 
enunciated a long-term goal for the yuan to become an internationally 
significant reserve and transactional currency—a trend that will 
further reinforce Beijing’s capacity to take foreign policy positions on 
various issues at odds with American preferences. 
As Chinese interests in the Middle East expand and deepen, 
the region is likely to become a progressively more salient arena for 
working out the balance of competitive and cooperative dynamics in 
the U.S.-China relationship. If Washington were actually to impose 
secondary sanctions against major Chinese companies and/or 
financial institutions over their dealings with Iran—a growing 
likelihood, given the extent of congressional activism on the issue 
and the Obama Administration’s supine collaboration with the Hill 
on sanctions policy—this would almost certainly prompt a substantial 
“soft balancing” response from Beijing. It would also provide an 
                                                 
79 See Hu Jintao Holds Talks With Russian President Putin, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (中國人民共和國外交部部), 
June 5, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t939577.htm; Michael 
Sainsbury, China and Russia Seal Power Pact,  THE AUSTRALIAN (Austl.), June 2012, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-and-russia-seal-power-pact/ 
story-e6frg6so-1226388074073.  
80 See Schweller & Pu, supra note 63, at 46-47, 52-57 (on “delegitimation” 
and “deconcentration” as essential aspects of China’s emerging strategy to “contest 
U.S. hegemony within the established [international] order,”).   
81 Perlez, supra note 64. 
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already skeptical Chinese leadership with conclusive evidence that the 
United States is not interested in providing the public good of energy 
security where the People’s Republic is concerned—that, in fact, 
Washington wants to use its influence over the security of 
hydrocarbon flows from the Persian Gulf as a lever against China. 
That would be a profoundly negative development for America’s 
long-term position as a global leader. 
IV. RECASTING AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 
One of the most critical steps that American policymakers 
could take toward strategic recovery would be to revive and broaden 
the original Nixon-Kissinger grand bargain with China. This means 
reaffirming both U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic as a 
legitimate political entity representing legitimate national interests and 
America’s positive disposition toward China’s economic 
advancement. It also means acknowledging that a positive disposition 
toward China’s economic advancement implies significantly more 
than it did in the 1970s, when the People’s Republic was hardly a 
commercial presence in Asia (much less a global economic 
heavyweight) and largely self-sufficient in energy. 
Today, a revived Sino-American grand bargain needs to be 
backed up with credible U.S. policies in the Persian Gulf and the 
Middle East that help to create an environment conducive to the free 
flow of hydrocarbons to international markets. Such an environment 
should also be conducive to the Middle East’s ever deeper integration 
into various modalities of globalization—a process in which China 
could reasonably expect to play an expanding role. After World War 
II, the United States enabled Western Europe and Japan’s economic 
recovery and revitalization, to a considerable degree by guaranteeing 
adequate oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to European and 
Japanese markets. Today, America can choose to play a similar role 
with respect to China and other emerging economies in Asia that 
depend on hydrocarbon flows from the Persian Gulf. If, however, 
Washington prioritizes its quixotic quest for Middle Eastern 
hegemony over the public good of energy security, China (and 
others) will use soft balancing tools to restrain American initiatives 
and create the space in which they can negotiate the deals they need 
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with Persian Gulf energy producers to ensure adequate hydrocarbon 
supplies. This will marginalize the United States even further. 
In this regard, perhaps the most crucial step that the United 
States could take to restore its standing as a great power capable of 
shaping important strategic outcomes, not only in the Persian Gulf 
but also vis-à-vis China and other rising powers in the global South, 
is to pursue genuine rapprochement with Iran. To reverse the 
ongoing decline of America’s international position, in the Middle 
East and globally, Washington needs to revise its policy toward the 
Islamic Republic as fundamentally and comprehensively as it revised 
its policy toward the People’s Republic in the early 1970s. “Nixon-to-
China”-style rapprochement with Tehran—based on acceptance of 
the Islamic Republic as a legitimate political order representing 
legitimate national interests—would reflect a decisive turn away from 
the failed model of global transformation. It would also reflect a clear 
reorientation of American grand strategy toward the imperatives of 
global leadership. Alternatively, a U.S.-initiated war against the 
Islamic Republic—or a U.S.-facilitated attack by Israel—would have 
potentially devastating consequences for America’s international 
standing.82 
A leading Chinese academic expert on the Middle East 
recently remarked to us that the only force which can weaken the 
United States internationally is the United States itself. We agree. 
Over the next decade—perhaps even within the next year—
Washington will make decisions that will largely determine whether 
America plays a positive role in shaping the transition to a more 
genuinely multipolar world, based on realistic management of the 
distribution of power in key regional and global arenas and effective 
provision of important public goods for a still globalizing world, or 
whether it is ultimately the biggest loser in this transition. The choice 
is up to Americans and their leaders. 
 
                                                 
82 For further discussion, see Leverett & Leverett, GOING TO TEHRAN, 
supra note 42, at Prologue to Pt. III, Ch. 9.   
